Trump’s territorial ambitions shake a weary world

When Donald J. Trump won a return to the White House, many countries thought they knew what to expect and how to prepare for what was to come.

Diplomats in world capitals have said they will focus more on what Mr Trump’s administration does than what he says. The larger powers devised plans to mitigate or counter the threat of his punitive tariffs. The smaller countries hoped that America First would simply hide from the hurricane that would last four more years.

But it is becoming increasingly difficult for the world to maintain peace.

At a press conference at Mar-a-Lago on Tuesday, Mr. Trump refused to rule out the use of force in a potential land grab for Greenland and the Panama Canal. He promised to rename the Gulf of Mexico “Gulf of America”. He also said America could use “economic power” to make Canada the 51st nation as a matter of national security.

For those willing to parse the substance from the bluster, it seemed like another performance of scattered bravado: Trump II, the sequel, more unhinged. Even before taking office, Mr. Trump stirred things up with a surprising wish list “Here We Go Again” comments from around the world.

There are serious risks beyond the conversation. As the world prepares for Trump’s return, the parallels between his preoccupations and the distant era of late 19th-century American imperialism become even more pressing.

Mr Trump has already defended the era of protectionism in the 1890s, claiming that the US was “the richest country because of the tariff system”. Now, it seems, he is adding attention from the 19th and early 20th centuries over territorial control.

What both eras share is the fear of shaky geopolitics and the threat of being left out of areas of great economic and military importance. As Daniel Immervahr, an American historian at Northwestern University, puts it: “We’re seeing a return to an angrier world.”

According to Mr. Trump, China is willing to buy territories far from its borders. He falsely accused Beijing of controlling the Panama Canal built by America. There is also the more realistic specter of China and its ally Russia moving to secure control over Arctic sea routes and valuable minerals.

At the same time, competition is increasing everywhere as some states (India, Saudi Arabia) rise while others (Venezuela, Syria) spiral and struggle, creating ample opportunities for outside influence.

There was also a struggle for control in the 1880s and 90s, and there was no single dominant nation. As countries grew stronger, they were expected to grow physically, and competition was redrawing maps and fueling conflicts from Asia to the Caribbean.

The United States reflected European colonial plans when it annexed Guam and Puerto Rico in 1898. But in larger countries like the Philippines, the US has opted for indirect control, negotiating preferential treatment for American businesses and its military interests.

Some believe that Mr. Trump’s fixation on Greenland, the Panama Canal and even Canada is a one-man revival of the debate over expansionist pursuits.

“This is part of a pattern of the United States still controlling or attempting to control areas of the world that are American interests without invoking the dreaded words ’empire’, ‘colonies’ or ‘imperialism.’ to acquire material goods,” says Ian Tyrrell, a historian of the American empire at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia.

Mr. Trump’s territorial grab threats may simply be a transactional starting point or some kind of personal wish. The US already has an agreement with Denmark that allows base operations in Greenland.

His proposal for Americanization there and elsewhere amounts to what many foreign diplomats and scholars see as an escalation rather than a break with the past. For years, the United States has tried to limit China’s ambitions with a familiar playbook.

The Philippines is back in the spotlight with new deals for bases the US military could use in any potential war with Beijing. So are the most important sea routes for trade, both in Asia and around the Arctic, as climate change melts ice and makes navigation easier.

“What the US always wanted was access to markets, lines of communication and the ability to project material power forward,” Professor Tyrrell said.

But especially for some regions, the past as a prologue creates fear.

Panama and its neighbors see Mr Trump’s comments as a mix of the 1890s and 1980s, when the Cold War saw Washington intervene in many Latin American countries under the guise of fighting communism. Another 19th-century creation, the Monroe Doctrine, which saw the United States adopt the Western Hemisphere as its exclusive sphere of influence, became relevant again, along with tariffs and territorial agreements.

Carlos Puig, a popular columnist in Mexico City, said Latin America was more concerned about Mr. Trump’s return than anywhere else in the world.

“This is a Trump with majorities in both houses, a complainer after four years, a man who only cares about himself and wins at all costs,” Mr. Puig said. “It’s not easy for a guy like that not to show that he’s trying to keep his promises, no matter how crazy they are. I’m not so sure it’s all just violence and almost comical diversions.”

But how much can Mr. Trump actually accomplish or hurt?

His press conference in Florida mixed vague threats (“You might have to do something”) with Christian promises (“I’m talking about protecting the free world”).

Even before he took office, there were more than enough to rouse, attract attention, and resist other nations.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot warned on Wednesday not to threaten the country’s “sovereign borders”. European Union — Refers to the Danish territory of Greenland. He added that “we have entered an era that sees the return of the law of the fittest.”

It may be harder to see from Mar-a-Lago, but it’s much discussed in foreign capitals: Many countries are simply tired of America. Mr. Trump wants to be great again.

While the United States is still the dominant power, it has less leverage than it did in the 1980s or 1890s, not only because of China’s rise, but also because of what many see as America’s own slide into dysfunction and debt. development by other countries.

The international system that the United States helped build after World War II prioritized trade in hopes of preventing conquest—and it worked well enough to establish pathways to progress that made American unilateralism less powerful.

As Sarang Shidor, director of the global south program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Public Administration in Washington, explained, many developing countries are “more savior, more assertive and capable, while the US is less predictable and stable.”

So today the world has calmed down. The postwar equilibrium is shaken by wars in Europe and the Middle East; with the autocratic partnership of China, Russia and North Korea; by a weakened Iran seeking nuclear weapons; and with climate change and artificial intelligence.

The end of the 19th century was also turbulent. The mistake Mr. Trump could make now, historians say, is thinking he can pacify and simplify the world with extra US real estate.

The protectionist, imperialist age that Mr. Trump seemingly romanticizes has exploded as Germany and Italy jostle for a bigger slice of the world. As a result, two world wars took place.

“We saw how it went with 20th-century weapons,” said Mr. Immerwahr, author of “How to Hide an Empire: A Brief History of the Great United States.” “It’s potentially more dangerous at 21.”