How 2024 reordered the Middle East

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The author is the director of regional security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the newly released Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean. co-editor of the book Geopolitics, Security and Energy Dynamics

If ever there was a time to use the best words in Middle Eastern affairs, it is 2024. The cascade of events that began in October 2023 was not dizzying , what has already happened will undoubtedly have a lasting impact.

The diverse and already fragile Levantine societies are undergoing dramatic historical transformations. In doing so, they are unlikely to find much outside help, given both local reluctance and global fatigue.

The Palestinians are suffering unprecedentedly at the hands of the Israeli military. The failed bloody bet of Hamas and the inability of its partners to come to the aid, if needed, is a reminder that the only way to Palestinian statehood is through its internationalization and the outcome of negotiations with Saudi Arabia. A coalition of two-state solution organized by other Arab states and European countries has emerged as the most likely way to do so. The Palestinians must be convinced that it is more than a symbolic diplomatic dance, but they must also show ownership of the process, which only the long-awaited reform of the Palestinian Authority can do. However, such aspirations remain possible due to Israeli intransigence and Donald Trump under the influence of anger.

In parallel, Israeli society has gone from extreme trauma to military victory in one year. This has reinforced the belief that Israel can only rely on its military might, and that expansionism in Gaza, the occupied West Bank, and now southern Syria is not only justified, but required. Israel’s unconditional support from the US and several European states has allowed it to deny the need for a just peace that would ensure everyone’s safety.

But this security-only mindset has perverse consequences: it increases dependence on the United States and alienates existing and future partners in the neighborhood who fear that Israel will escalate the conflict by striking Iran’s leadership and nuclear facilities in Gaza The reputation is huge and legal liabilities are expected. internal fractures related to the nature of the Israeli state.

For the Lebanese, the opposite dynamic is at play. Hezbollah must reckon with the collapse of its military strategy, its ideological narrative, and its need to lick its resistance ethos, given the dire state of its electorate , who sense an opportunity, face two opposing forces. they understand that they will not get more opportunities to reform their state, but they also recognize the risk of provoking a wounded Hezbollah that could spark internal strife.

Above all, Syrians are getting their first taste of freedom after decades of oppression. The Assad regime’s rapid collapse, devoid of the horrific scenes of sectarian violence, has shown restraint and some wisdom, however and tremendous feats of commitment to inclusive governance despite internal and external spoilers.

At least the Syrians can enjoy the fact that they have exposed the flaws of realpolitik. It is a supreme irony that a decade ago most Arab and Western states wanted the Assad regime to fall apart. By early December, many Arab and Western countries did , for Assad to stay, but the Syrians mostly united to force internal change.They will now need external goodwill. In order to achieve Arab-Kurdish reconciliation, Turkish moderation and US diplomacy will be of crucial importance. To appease the Alawite community, Russian mediation can help.Gulf countries can help neutralize Iran’s influence.

Iran is the undeniable loser in all this. It cooperated with militias to increase its influence in fractured states and divided societies. It expected these groups to advance its interests. Instead, it became embroiled in wars of its own. Turkey took advantage of Tehran, the central geopolitical arena in the region.

Many Western capitals will take solace in the fact that so far these historic transformations have been remarkably subdued: no mass migration crisis, no protracted state-to-state war, no major terrorism, no lasting impact on oil prices, no consequential disruption to global trade. This is the kind of complacency that paves the way for unwanted surprises.